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Abstract. In a  recent discussion, trenton merricks concludes that we cannot 
understand how God might miraculously bring it about that there will be the 
resurrection of the body. It is contended to the contrary, that it is not utterly 
mysterious how God might give us our bodies back.
tHe DoCtrINe
The Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body is explained by 
trenton merricks as follows: ‘we shall not spend eternity as mere spirits 
or as disembodied souls. Instead, we shall have hands and feet and size 
and shape. For, we shall have bodies. And not just any bodies. each of us 
will have the very same body that he or she had in this life, although the 
body will be “glorified”. each of us can have the same body because, at 
some point in the future, all those bodies that have died will rise again 
to new life. That is, dead bodies will be resurrected.’1 However, he points 
out that this raises the question: ‘how could a body that has passed out 
of existence – perhaps as a result of decay or cremation – come back into 
existence on the Day of the resurrection?’2
1 ‘The resurrection of the body’, Chapter 21 in Thomas P. Flint and michael C. rea, The 
Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, oxford: oxford university Press, 2009, p. 476.
2 Ibid.
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tHe DIFFICultIeS
In answer to it, merricks notes that ‘[o]ver the centuries, the most common 
account amongst Christian philosophers and theologians, an account 
that was also countenanced by Islamic and Jewish thinkers, has been this: 
on the last Day, God will gather up the very small bits that composed 
a body at death and will “reassemble” them, which will thereby bring the 
body that died back into existence …’3 Yet, ‘[o]ne potential problem with 
this account is that even a body’s smallest parts might themselves go out 
of existence [e.g., matter might be converted to energy].’4 And, ‘[a]nother 
objection to resurrection as reassembly trades on the many ways in which 
the small parts of one body can end up as parts of another body [e.g., 
most starkly in the instance of cannibalism].’5 Furthermore, ‘our bodies 
are constantly changing with respect to the very small bits that compose 
them … Therefore, a  body’s identity from one moment to the next is 
not a matter of having exactly the same very small parts.’6 Thus, it seems 
that ‘nothing could account for or ground identity across (at least some) 
resurrection-induced temporal gaps.’7 This notwithstanding, merricks 
contends that believers ‘can simply conclude that there will be something 
in virtue of which each resurrection body will be identical with a body 
had in this life, something that will ground or account for that identity. 
Crucially, they can conclude this even given their inability to discover 
that ground, an inability evidenced by the failure of proposed accounts 
such as reassembly. After all, no one should presume to know exactly 
how God pulls off any miracle, including the resurrection of the body.’8 
However, this will not do. For, it is incumbent upon anyone defending 
any scriptural doctrine to show that it is not absurd, ‘lest Holy Scripture 
be exposed to the ridicule of unbelievers, and obstacles be placed to their 
believing.’9 So, can this be achieved?
3 Ibid., p. 478.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., pp. 478-9.
7 Ibid., p. 480.
8 Ibid.
9 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 2a2ae,. 33, 4 ad 2.
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boDIlY SAmeNeSS
In order to answer this question, note that merricks says that ‘[e]ach of 
us will have the very same body that he or she had in this life, although 
the body will be “glorified”.’ And, since this flesh, and this blood, and this 
bone, cease to exist in the dissolution of death, the idea of getting our 
bodies back does not seem to make much sense. However, this is not 
entirely correct. For, although after dissolution it might be impossible for 
me to get the same body back numerically, I could get it back otherwise, 
since there is more than one meaning of sameness: ‘things are said to be 
the same … whose matter is one either in kind or in number … [and it is 
also the case that] … those whose essence [form] is one, are said to be the 
same.’10 Therefore, after its dissolution, my resurrected body would be the 
‘same’ body that I had earlier if it had the same essential character. For, it 
then it would have exactly the same material and formal qualities it had 
earlier, perfected and glorified. 
Yet, this does not appear to do complete justice to the doctrine. For, by it, 
it seems that I am meant to get this very same body back, which means 
also numerical sameness. So, can this be retained? Not, it would seem, 
if we subscribe to Dean W. Zimmerman’s argument from fission; viz. 
that, ‘just before it completely loses its living form … [God enables] … 
each particle to divide – or at least to be immanent-causally responsible 
for two resulting particle-stages. one of the resulting particle-stages is 
right here, where the old one was; another is either in heaven now (for 
immediate resurrectionists), or somewhere in the far future.’11 For, then 
the resultant can hardly be said to be me, but rather me divided. However, 
the suggestion that somehow or other there must be two ‘me’s’ for me to 
get my body back at the resurrection is not altogether unpromising. For, 
for the time that I am alive, my body is my physical form. Yet, the body 
of the risen Christ is meant to be imperishable, glorious, powerful, and 
spiritual in nature12, and ‘whoever has a glorified body has it in his power 
10 Aristotle, Metaphysics, V, 9.
11 ‘The Compatibility of materialism and Survival: “The Falling elevator” model’, 
Faith and Philosophy, vol. 16, no. 2, April 1999, p. 206. (Note that timothy o’Connor and 
Jonathan D. Jacobs have recently advanced an intriguing version of this argument. [See 
‘emergent Individuals and the resurrection’, European Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 
vol. 2, no. 2, 2010.] However, for the same reason it is also unacceptable.)
12 St Paul, 1 Corinthians, 15:42-44.
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to be seen when he so wishes, and not to be seen when he does not wish 
it [and pass through walls13, and so on].’14 So, might it not be the case 
that, when I die, my body is spiritualized; so that what is now my body 
ceases to be my body at all? That is, as a snake sheds its skin, my body-as-
body is then transformed into my body-as-soul, and leaves its former self 
behind. For example, from physical element-of-my-body x is actuated 
metaphysical element-of-my-body x; so physical element x is reduced to 
being merely a random element, and my continuity as a body is in terms 
of metaphysical element x.15 For, a body is a unity, and this unity has now 
assumed the form of being a unity of metaphysical parts. This is arguably 
why ‘ancient corpses suddenly become ashes in the grave’16, for they are 
no longer really ‘bodies’ at all. Thus, just as ‘a dead man is a man in only 
in name’17, so too would a  dead body be a  body in name only.18 (This 
is because its unity – for as long as it lasts – is now merely accidental.) 
Consequently, although ‘[s]omeone may ask, “How are dead people 
raised and what sort of body do they have when they come back?” They 
are stupid questions. Whatever you sow in the ground … is not what is 
going to come; you sow a bare grain, say of wheat or something like that, 
and then God gives it the sort of body that he has chosen … It is the same 
with the resurrection of the dead: the thing that is sown is perishable but 
what is raised is imperishable … glorious …’19
CoNCluSIoN
It need not be relegated to the realms of absolute mystery how God might 
give us our bodies back in the end. For, despite the temporal gap between 
the dissolution of my material body and the Day of the resurrection, there 
is understandably a way for my disembodied soul then to be allocated 
exactly the same body I had in death; viz. through bodily transformation.
13 John, 20:19. 
14 St Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3a. 54, 1 ad 2.
15 There is nothing esoteric about this: evidently there are emergent metaphysical 
powers in things – e.g., life in seeds – so why not also emergent metaphysical properties?
16 Aristotle, Meteorology, IV, 12.
17 Aristotle, Meteorology, loc. cit.
18 Needless to say, the notion of a spiritual body is itself conceptually opaque.
19 St Paul, 1 Corinthians, 15: 35-44.
